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ABSTRACT
The goal of the FOREVER project is to develop a service
for Fault/intrusiOn REmoVal through Evolution & Recov-
ery. In order to achieve this goal, our work addresses three
main tasks: the definition of the FOREVER service archi-
tecture; the analysis of how diversity techniques can im-
prove resilience; and the evaluation of the FOREVER ser-
vice. The FOREVER service is an important contribution to
intrusion-tolerant replication middleware and significantly
enhances the resilience.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Computer Systems Organization]: Performance of
Systems; D.4.5 [Operating Systems]: Reliability; C.2.4
[Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed
Systems
Keywords
Replication, Intrusion Tolerance, Proactive Recovery
1. INTRODUCTION
Threats evolve during system lifetime “because attackers
are actively involved in the development of new techniques to
inject and, or, activate latent faults in existing systems” [1].
This means that resilient systems need also to evolve in order
that attacks do not lead to system failures.
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The ideal goal of evolution is the complete removal of
vulnerabilities (thus eliminating any chances of an attack
causing a failure), but it is well known that such goal is
very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Nevertheless,
one can minimize the number of vulnerabilities by apply-
ing security patches to operating systems or by introducing
newer (better) versions of the application code. The remain-
ing vulnerabilities may be targeted by attacks and produce
failures or intrusions. A resilient system needs to deal with
such faults/intrusions, which may be masked through fault-
/intrusion tolerance protocols. These protocols are typically
run on replicated systems (with each replica redundantly ex-
ecuting client requests), and are able to tolerate the failures
of a finite set of f replicas.
Given a sufficient amount of time, a malicious adversary
can find ways to compromise more than f replicas. There-
fore, if one wants to build a resilient system that is continu-
ously operating, some sort of recovery mechanism will need
to be added. The goal would be to detect and recover com-
promised replicas at a pace faster than the time needed by
an adversary to compromise more than f replicas. Arbitrary
faults are, however, very difficult to detect. An alternative
approach is to calculate the minimum time needed by an
adversary to compromise more than f replicas and (proac-
tively) trigger periodic replica recoveries at a faster pace [2].
Note that the time needed to compromise more than f repli-
cas is highly dependent on how diverse replicas are.
The goal of the FOREVER project1 is to address some
of the challenges that arise in this situation by developing
a Fault/intrusiOn REmoVal through Evolution & Recovery
service. This service can be used to enhance the resilience
of replicated systems, namely those that can be affected by
malicious attacks. In order to achieve this goal, our work
pursues three tasks: It defines the FOREVER service archi-
tecture, it analyses how diversity may be introduced both
in space (replicas) and in time (recoveries), and it evaluates
the FOREVER service with stochastic modelling.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section describes the FOREVER service. Section 3
discusses diversity management. Section 4 explains our ap-
1http://forever.di.fc.ul.pt/
proach to evaluate the FOREVER service architecture. Fi-
nally, Section 5 concludes.
2. FOREVER SERVICE ARCHITECTURE
Removing faults (or malicious intrusions) requires a timely
and reliable recovery mechanism. This recovery support
cannot be directly integrated in a traditional middleware
layer between operating system and replicated application,
as a malicious intruder could easily disable the recovery. A
recovery service needs to be implemented in a trusted com-
puting base (TCB).
The simplest recovery procedure is to boot a clean image
containing the original operating system and application(s)
code, and to obtain the current state from the remaining
replicas. Clearly this technique removes the effects of any
faults/intrusions that could have occurred before the recov-
ery. However, the adversary may have acquired knowledge
before the recovery (e.g., the password of some user, the
version of the operating system) sufficient to deploy a more
advanced attack after the recovery. Following this reasoning,
the adversary may accumulate knowledge over time (days,
weeks, months) until it is able to compromise more than f
replicas between recoveries. This means that diversity in the
space domain should be complemented with diversity in the
time domain: recoveries should introduce diversity.
The main objective of the FOREVER service architecture
is to extend and generalize previous work on proactive/re-
active recovery [3] in order to support application and OS
online upgrades (i.e., evolutions), online recovery [4] and
self-monitoring. The specific objectives are as follows:
• to allow online upgrades of applications (e.g., installa-
tion of new versions), middleware, and operating sys-
tems (e.g., installation of security patches). These up-
grades may need to be coordinated if they are incom-
patible with the previous (application or OS) version
and the coordination should be done in a way that the
impact on availability is minimal;
• to integrate existing work on intrusion detection based
on monitoring with virtual machine technology. This
allows us to improve the capabilities of (application)
self-monitoring and intrusion detection, triggering re-
coveries when needed.
Based on our previous work [3, 4], we have identified two
variants of the FOREVER system architecture, each using a
hypervisor (Xen in our prototype) to provide a TCB for the
FOREVER service. In the first variant, only the FOREVER
service is executed within the TCB, and the remaining repli-
cation functionality is part of the middleware in the applica-
tion domain. The second variant moves more functionalities
(group communication, voting, state transfer support) to the
TCB. The benefit of simpler and more efficient replication
mechanisms comes at the expense of an increased TCB size.
3. DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT
Diversity of replicas is a critical issue, because the system
must avoid that an adversary obtains control over more than
f replicas simultaneously. The main objective of FOREVER
is to analyze how diversity may be introduced effectively
both in space (replicas) and in time (recoveries), in this way
modifying the vulnerabilities that may be exploited by a
malicious adversary.
We intend to use COTS (Components-off-the-shelf) diver-
sity for FOREVER, i.e., each replica uses a different soft-
ware configuration (OS, JVM, middleware). Our current
approach uses the National Vulnerability Database2 to sta-
tistically quantify the diversity of COTS software. While
not completely fault independent, our preliminary study in-
dicates that, for example, different COTS operating system
families (Linux, *BSD, Solaris, Windows) have only few vul-
nerabilities in common. This study also indicates the prob-
ability of common-mode failures, which we can later use to
analytically model the system, in order to quantify if COTS
software is sufficiently diverse.
We are currently also studying mechanisms (e.g., instruc-
tion-set randomization, address-space randomization) and
develop novel heuristics to generate diversity (in either ap-
plication/OS configuration or runtime environment). These
techniques, which may include the modification of OS access
passwords, protocols, open ports, authentication method
etc., help to increase replica diversity in time.
4. EVALUATION
In ongoing work, we will evaluate the FOREVER service
and assess its dependability properties. Models will take
into account Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) replication, re-
coveries and evolution (diversity), using as a basis real data
from the vulnerability database study mentioned above.
Evaluations will quantify the overhead of enhancing a
replicated system with the FOREVER service and evalu-
ate the benefits and the trade-off of introducing diversity in
the recovery process.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The FOREVER project is work in progress that makes
significant contributions to middleware infrastructures for
intrusion-tolerant replication. The FOREVER service ar-
chitecture allows online upgrades and diversity management
of replicas. Future system evaluation will use data from
the diversity study to analytically verify the benefits of the
proposed service architecture. The FOREVER service thus
allows enhancing the resilience of intrusion-tolerant systems.
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